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accompanying climate march in New York, which had
attracted 400,000 people from all over the United States,
had sent a clear signal that people in the US were expecting
the US Government to play a positive role in the
negotiations. The continued urgency of tackling climate
change decisively was underlined by the 5th Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). Furthermore, the initial capitalisation of the Green
Climate Fund had almost reached the aimed-for target of
at least US$10 billion. All these developments pointed to a
constructive conference in Lima, putting the negotiations
on a firm track towards adopting an agreement in Paris in
2015.
However, after the first week in Lima it became clear
that COP-20 would not enter the history of climate
diplomacy as one of the more constructive meetings. The
conference was, despite the US/China announcements by
high profile representatives, characterised by a continued
deep division at the working level between key players and
groups from the former so-called ‘developed’ and
‘developing’ world (enshrined in the division of Annex I
and non-Annex I countries of the UNFCCC). This became
apparent especially in the discussions on differentiation and
the role of  ‘loss and damage’ in the forthcoming agreement,
which pitted – as in the very old days – log-headed
negotiators from each group against each other. The
negotiations thus took 32 hours longer than planned and
ended on Sunday morning at 1.22 am – a considerable
prolongation even for seasoned negotiators.
As a consequence, the conference failed almost
completely to resolve the tasks it was supposed to do in
order to prepare the last round of negotiations before COP-
21 in Paris 2015. (See also the comment by M Hedemann-
Robinson in the Current Survey in this issue.) In the final
hours of Sunday morning the conference managed to adopt
the ‘Lima call for climate action’ and attached as an Annex
the ‘Elements for a draft negotiating text’ that had been
1 Introduction
The annual Conferences of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (COP-20/CMP-10)
in 2014 took place in Lima, Peru, from 1–12 December.
The significance of the event must be assessed in the light
of its main task: preparing for the next annual conference
2015 in Paris. The next major climate summit (COP-21)
is scheduled to deliver a comprehensive climate agreement
according to the Durban Platform formulated in 2011.
In the run-up to the conference some developments
had taken place that seemed to change the dynamics of the
process. Most importantly, the usual roles of the EU versus
the US and China were somehow reversed. The Union
adopted comparatively modest climate policies that fell
short of the level of ambition expected, whereas the
presidents of China and the US, in a surprise bilateral move,
had announced plans that exceeded expectations.
Notwithstanding the fact that these plans were non-binding
and not ambitious enough to keep emission levels below a
safe level, the two largest polluters did appear to represent
the spearhead of climate protection. This certainly lent
much more credibility to the approach those countries
advocated, which is characterised by voluntary
contributions instead of legally binding commitments. It
was also the first time ever the two largest polluters had
presented such a major joint initiative, marking a widely
applauded departure from their historical finger-pointing.
The mood of most negotiators was therefore slightly
upbeat when they arrived in Lima. The Climate Summit
initiated by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in
September had demonstrated that climate change ranked
amongst the top priorities in world affairs. The
*  This article is reproduced here with kind permission of Dr
Hermann E. Ott, Senior Advisor for Global Sustainability and
Welfare Strategies, and all authors. It was first posted on the
Institute website on 20 April 2015  http://wupperinst.org/fa/
redaktion/downloads/publications/Post_Lima_Pre_Paris.pdf.
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the subject of intense negotiations.1 The conference did so
without narrowing down the considerable number of
multiple options, thus leaving the negotiators with a
formidable task to resolve in the next year. This article is
based on an early assessment2 by the Wuppertal Institute
from December 2014, which has been extended in order
to allow a deeper analysis of the consequences for COP-
21 in Paris.
2 Negotiating a new climate agreement
The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action (ADP) was at the centre of the
negotiations since it aims to develop ‘a protocol, another
legal instrument or agreed outcome with legal force under
the Convention applicable to all Parties’, which is to be
adopted at this year’s conference in Paris and to be
implemented from 2020. Several key issues needed to be
clarified in Lima, in particular how exactly countries will
participate in the new agreement, the differentiation among
countries and transparency. Last year’s conference in
Warsaw had decided that countries should submit their
intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) to
the Paris Agreement early in 2015, but had failed to provide
further guidance.
The Lima Conference was therefore tasked with
providing guidance on the scope of INDCs, what
information countries would be required to provide
alongside their INDCs to enable their assessment, whether
there would be an international review of the INDCs prior
to the adoption of the Paris Agreement and what this
assessment would look like. In addition, the Lima
Conference was supposed to develop a first draft of a
negotiating text for the new agreement.
However, only very few of those tasks were actually
completed in Lima owing to disagreements over the
respective roles of the so-called ‘industrialised’ and
‘developing’ countries, something which has plagued the
climate regime from the beginning. The traditional
industrialised countries (listed in Annex I of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change) have been
keen to break down the so-called ‘firewall’, the clear
distinction between Annex I and non-Annex I countries
(traditionally ‘developing countries’) that is laid down in
the Framework Convention of 1992. They argue that this
distinction is outdated since many non-Annex I countries
are nowadays wealthier than many of the traditional
industrialised countries and that their contribution to global
emissions has also grown rapidly.
By contrast, in particular the group of ‘like-minded
developing countries’ (LMDCs), which includes China and
India, some other Asian countries such as Pakistan, OPEC
countries such as Saudi Arabia as well as the left-leaning
Latin American countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela,
has so far strongly resisted any explicit or implicit
dissolution of the traditional distinction between the
Annexes. They have maintained that Annex I countries
should continue to take the lead since they are the ones
who caused the climate problem, even nowadays have much
larger economic resources to do something about it and
have, in the view of the LMDCs, so far mostly failed to do
their duty in terms of reducing their own emissions and in
providing support to non-Annex I countries.
In Lima, this traditional divide once again came to the
fore in a number of ways. There was a dispute on whether
to include a specific reference to the Convention’s principle
that countries should contribute in line with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities
(CBDR-RC), which many negotiators see as a form of
shorthand for maintaining the ‘firewall’. The USA had
therefore insisted on keeping any references to CBDR-RC
out of the Durban and subsequent decisions on the ADP. In
Lima, industrialised countries were prepared to accept
references to CBDR-RC only if they included language that
the principle needed to be interpreted in an ‘evolutionary’
or ‘dynamic’ manner. However, the LMDCs strongly
rejected including any such language, arguing that it would
amount to a rewriting of the Convention.
On INDCs, industrialised countries held that
contributions should only address mitigation and that all
countries should be obliged to offer an unconditional
mitigation contribution. By contrast, many developing
countries posited that INDCs should also include adaptation
and financial, technology and capacity-building support
from industrialised to developing countries. They also
demanded that mitigation contributions by developing
countries should, as has so far been the case, be conditional
on the provision of support by industrialised countries. They
argued that the need to adapt to the mounting impacts of
climate change was substantially taxing their resources,
which were consequently not available for emission
reduction actions, and recalled Article 4 of the Convention,
according to which efforts by developing countries
1 Decision 1/CP20 FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1 ‘Lima call for
climate action’ http://unfccc.int/meetings/lima_dec_2014/
meeting/8141/php/view/decisions.php.
2 Hermann E Ott, Christof Arens, Lukas Hermwille, Florian
Mersmann, Wolfgang Obergassel and Hanna Wang-Helmreich  ‘A
first assessment of the Climate Conference in Lima: COP20 moves
at a snail’s pace on the road to Paris 2015’ (2014) 26(5)
Environmental Law & Management 153–60; http://wupperinst.org/
uploads/tx_wupperinst/lima-results.pdf.
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depended on the extent to which industrialised countries
fulfilled their commitments to provide support.
Many developing countries also demanded specification
of volumes and timetables for financial support, which
industrialised countries rejected pointing to the budgetary
prerogative of their parliaments. Industrialised countries
for their part demanded that the donor base should be
broadened and that all countries in a position to do so
should provide financial support to poorer countries. Whilst
the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS), the least
developed countries (LDCs) and the Association of
Independent Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC)
agreed with industrialised countries that mitigation should
be central to all countries’ INDCs, the LMDCs maintained
that non-Annex I countries should be allowed to offer only
adaptation contributions.
Another issue on which the divide between LMDCs and
most industrialised countries came to the fore was information
requirements for reporting INDCs. What kind of
accompanying information would countries need to submit
alongside their intended contribution in order to allow other
countries (and the public in general) to assess the INDCs?
Equally important, would there be an assessment phase for
the submitted information under the UNFCCC in the run-up
to Paris? The latter would be important in order to assess
whether the sum of the INDCs would be sufficient to keep
the world below the 2°C target and whether individual
countries’ INDCs constituted a fair share.
The LMDCs posited that the information requirements
for industrialised and developing countries should be
differentiated and rejected any international assessment of
developing countries’ contributions. Most Annex I
countries outside the EU suggested a short review phase,
which would not be expected to change the proposed
contributions significantly. AILAC, AOSIS, the EU and the
LDCs proposed a more detailed ex ante review to assess if
individual INDCs represented a country’s fair share of the
overall effort and whether they were collectively sufficient
to achieve the below 2°C target. Previously in Warsaw the
African Group had proposed an assessment based on a
principle-based equity reference framework to review the
adequacy of the proposed contributions in terms of
ambition, equity and fairness.
A further issue was whether particular groups of
countries should be required to adopt particular types of
contributions. Developing countries demanded that
industrialised countries should adopt legally binding
economy-wide emission reduction targets along the lines
of the Kyoto Protocol. Industrialised countries in turn
maintained that all major economies should be required to
adopt economy-wide targets. They conceded that in case
of non-Annex I countries these might be intensity-based
rather than absolute targets, but over time all countries
should aspire to adopting economy-wide absolute targets.
The Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS) also stressed
the importance of mandatory mitigation contributions for
all major emitters. Brazil tried to find a middle ground by
submitting a proposal for ‘concentric differentiation’. Brazil
envisaged a system of concentric circles, with Annex I
countries placed in the middle adopting economy-wide
absolute emission targets, and other countries placed in
outer circles depending on their respective responsibilities
and national capabilities and adopting intensity-based
targets, targets defined as a deviation from business as usual,
per capita targets or individual actions.3
Further controversies revolved around the timeframe
of contributions. The EU, China and others argued that
contributions should have 2030 as the target date,
highlighting the need to give long-term certainty to
investors and the effort required to prepare contributions.
By contrast, AILAC, AOSIS, the LDCs and the USA,
alongside civil society groups organised in the Climate
Action Network, called for five-year cycles in order to
prevent a lock-in of low ambition.
A further contentious issue was the scope of the 2015
Agreement. Developing countries requested that
adaptation and mitigation should be treated equally in the
new agreement, and some of them suggested language on
legal parity of the two topics. In particular, AOSIS and the
LDCs – the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of
climate change – also requested to reference loss and
damage specifically from climate impacts that cannot be
addressed by adaptation as a stand-alone item (see further
on loss and damage below).
Industrialised countries were willing to accept language
on the crucial importance of adaptation but rejected
language on parity with mitigation. They also continued to
maintain their past position that loss and damage should
be addressed in the context of adaptation instead of being
treated as a separate element. Industrialised countries are
afraid that any opening of the loss and damage issue might
ultimately lead to their being legally required to pay
compensation to developing countries for their past GHG
emissions and have hence tried to keep the profile of this
issue as low as possible.
As so often in the past, the decision finally adopted by the
conference4 was pared down to a bare minimum to avoid issues
3 ‘Views of Brazil on the elements of the new agreement’ 6
November 2014  http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/
OSPSubmissionUpload/73_99_130602104651393682-
BRAZIL%20ADP%20Elements.pdf.
4 ‘Lima call for climate action’ (n 1).
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5 Ed King ‘US–China chat broke impasse at Lima climate talks’
http://www.rtcc.org/2014/12/16/us-china-chat-broke-impasse-
at-lima-climate-talks/.
of disagreement. The 2015 Agreement is supposed to reflect
‘the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities, in light of different national
circumstances’. This language was lifted verbatim from the
Sino–US Agreement and served to paper over the different
positions for the moment as it can be read as maintaining the
old distinction between the Annexes or as opening up potential
differentiation based on countries’ individual circumstances.5
The decision once again urges developed countries to provide
and mobilise enhanced financial support. Instead of urging
other countries in a position to do so also to provide support,
as Annex I countries had demanded, the decision only
‘recognises complementary support by other Parties’.
As regards the scope of the INDCs, all parties are explicitly
invited to consider including an adaptation component in their
INDCs but otherwise the scope is left entirely to the discretion
of countries. The decision does not require developed countries
also to include finance commitments in their INDCs.
Concerning the level of the submitted INDCs, each party’s
INDC is supposed to ‘represent a progression beyond the
current undertaking of that Party’. This formulation is aimed
at installing a ratchet mechanism, where contributions are
continually strengthened – and to prevent backsliding behind
parties’ current pledges. However, the Annex with the advance
information requirements did not survive. The decision now
contains only one paragraph with some specifications. Instead
of requiring parties to provide the listed information, the
language is now formulated in a non-binding manner
(‘information to be provided by Parties … may include …’),
and the subsequent list is much less detailed than the lost Annex.
The list does not require a common timeframe, is less specific
on coverage, assumptions and methods, and does not require
information on the intended use of markets nor specifications
for the treatment of land use, land-use change and forestry.
In addition, the decision does not foresee any international
assessment of individual INDCs. The INDCs are merely to be
published on the UNFCCC website and only the aggregate
level of effort will be assessed, in a synthesis report to be
prepared by the Secretariat by 1 November 2015. Since this is
only one month before the Paris Conference, any subsequent
changes to the INDCs are highly unlikely. On loss and damage,
developing countries did not get what they were fighting for
since it is not listed as one of the elements of the Paris
Agreement. Instead, the decision only welcomes the progress
made towards implementation of the ‘Warsaw international
mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change
impacts (WIM, and see further below).
The subsequent ADP session in February 2015 had the
task of producing a formal negotiating text which could be
formally communicated to all UNFCCC Parties before May
2015. This is the deadline for the adoption of a Protocol at the
Paris conference six months later – if a Protocol is the route
Parties eventually decide to follow. The Durban Platform also
leaves open the option to adopt ‘another legal instrument or
agreed outcome with legal force’ and so far there has been no
rapprochement of views on what legal form the Paris
agreement should have. The task of agreeing on a formal
negotiating text was completed in Geneva, but essentially only
by foregoing actual negotiations and instead allowing each Party
to insert its preferred language into the document. The final
Geneva text thus runs to 90 pages, with a large number of
alternative options on most issues.5a
3 Enhancing short-term ambition
before 2020
In some contrast to the rather entrenched negotiations on a
new climate agreement outlined above, the atmosphere in this
part of the negotiations was much more constructive. Those
two ‘workstreams’ for the negotiations had been the result of
a compromise at COP-17 in Durban (2011), where developing
countries had agreed to negotiating a new ‘comprehensive’
climate agreement under the Convention for the time after
2020 (Workstream 1) – comprehensively meaning that it
would not apply only to industrialised countries. Unlike the
Kyoto Protocol, this agreement would entail contributions by
all countries, varying only in their content but not in their
legal form. On the other side of the bargain, industrialised
countries had agreed to negotiations on how to increase the
ambition of their own mitigation commitments for the time
before 2020 (Workstream 2).
Hence, Workstream 2 (WS2) started out as a process
mainly to negotiate new and increased mitigation
commitments for Annex 1 countries. Urging on the rapid
ratification of the second commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol became a second task that was frequently put forward
by developing countries. This process so far has not been
particularly successful: not one developed country has
increased its mitigation commitment as compared to what
had been communicated in the Cancún Agreements back in
2010. Quite to the contrary, Japan has backtracked from its
earlier commitment and other countries such as Australia and
Canada have no policies in place that are nearly effective enough
to achieve their pledges.5b
5a Negotiating text (FCCC/ADP/2015/1) http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/adp2/eng/01.pdf.
5b Climate Action Tracker ‘Country Analysis’ http://
climateactiontracker.org/countries.html.
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However, as a kind of compensation for this failure, the
nature of this WS2 has changed significantly and added some
novel aspects to the negotiations. WS2 has become a forum of
open exchange with a strong push also for developing countries
to increase their pre-2020 mitigation ambition. With extensive
rounds of technical expert meetings (TEMs), WS2 has
established a mode of collaboration new to the UNFCCC
process, one which also allows actors from the sub-national
level to contribute their experiences.
The big questions for the meeting in Lima were the
following: would the innovative form of collaboration within
WS2 continue? Would it be possible to advance from the
exchange of information to a more action-oriented approach,
ie would it be possible to synthesise the outcome of the TEMs
and translate them into policy options that are actually taken
up by parties?
Given that the Paris Agreement will probably not be
sufficient to drive down greenhouse gas emissions to levels
compatible with the 2°C limit (let alone 1.5°C), a significant
mitigation gap will persist not only before 2020 but also
thereafter. The need to continue the efforts for closing this
gap was apparent to all parties and they therefore agreed to
renew the mandate for the technical examination process.
Some parties suggested providing the mandate until 2017 only.
Finally, however, the ADP concluded with a mandate to
continue the technical examination process between 2015 and
2020, but with an annual review of the progress of the process.
Equally important for a constructive continuation of the
technical examination process is the more specific mandate
that parties provided for the TEMs. Until now, TEMs had been
very broad in content. In Lima the parties agreed to build on
the results of earlier TEMs, to go into more detail and to ‘focus
on actionable policy options’.6 Furthermore, the technical
examination process will coordinate with other existing
activities such as the Technology Executive Committee, the
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), the Durban
Forum on capacity-building, the CDM Executive Board and
the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism (Global
Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund and Adaptation
Fund). This allows the use of synergies and focuses the support
through the various mechanisms on those instruments that
have been highlighted by the technical examination process,
thus ensuring a proliferation of best practice.
The decision also includes provisions for the last stage in
the process: implementing mitigation activities. The parties
agreed to ask the UNFCCC Secretariat to compile a synthesis
of the policy options, including a summary for policy-makers.
The idea is to formulate concrete policy options that can then
be picked up by policy-makers and implemented in their
respective national contexts.
To encourage this kind of political action, parties
encouraged the executive secretary and the president of the
Conference of the Parties to convene an annual high-level event
on enhancing implementation of climate action. COP
President Pulgar-Vidal had hosted a first such event in Lima.
The event included contributions from a wide range of
stakeholders, including a speech of the Secretary General of
the United Nations. Other contributions included civil society
representatives, sub-national governments and business
representatives. The variety of contributions was exceptional
for a formal UNFCCC high-level event.
In contrast to the lack of progress with respect to the post-
2020 agreement, discussions under WS2 can be considered
more successful. The continuation of the TEMs and an
improved focus towards implementation is a very positive
development. Negotiations under the UNFCCC dramatically
lag behind reality. Positive developments such as the enormous
digression of prices for renewable energy technologies and
their strong uptake not only in industrialised but increasingly
in emerging and developing countries is a dynamic that has
not yet spilled over into the hallways of the COP venue. It is
therefore more urgent than ever to short-cut the feedback
loops of this outside dynamic. An improved and continued
WS2 could well be a place at which the positive experiences
with climate change mitigation can create resonance within
the UNFCCC regime and create a momentum for more
ambitious mitigation commitments.
4 Other issues at stake in Lima
4.1 Reducing emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation (REDD+)
The previous COP in Warsaw had adopted no less than six
decisions on REDD+, finalising the main chapters of the
‘rulebook for REDD+’. One outstanding issue on the agenda
of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
(SBSTA) was guidance on environmental and social safeguards.
Whilst the EU, Norway and the USA proposed to develop
further guidance, many developing countries posited that
additional guidance on safeguards was ‘premature’. The
conference was unable to come to an agreement and ultimately
referred the item to the next SBSTA meeting. The REDD+
debate on safeguards thus echoes the debate on the clean
development mechanism (CDM), where so far no safeguards
at all have been adopted owing to the resistance of many
developing countries who maintain that international rules
on safeguards would be incompatible with their national
sovereignty.6 ‘Lima call for climate action’ (n 1) para 19 ‘Focus on actionablepolicy options’. Decision 1/CP20, FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.1.
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4.2 Loss and damage
In 2013, shortly before the COP, supertyphoon Haiyan
wreacked havoc in the Philippines, destroying about one
million houses and killing more than 7000 people. This
year, in the first days of the climate conference, one million
people on the Philippines fled from Typhoon Hagupit into
the hills in order to escape the forces of nature. It served as
a stark reminder that adaptation to the unavoidable impacts
of climate changes is, besides mitigation, the second pillar
of the climate regime. Many developing countries
meanwhile demand that compensation for loss and damage
due to climate change is recognised as a separate third pillar.
As it becomes increasingly unlikely that the world will stay
below a 2°C temperature rise (annual mean globally), the
question of who pays for the impacts is gaining more and
more relevance.
COP-19 last year in Warsaw had adopted the ‘Warsaw
international mechanism for loss and damage associated
with climate change impacts’ (WIM). COP-20 in Lima
approved the two-year workplan that had been developed
in the meantime and decided on the permanent structure
and composition of the executive committee of the WIM.
It will be composed of 10 members from Annex I countries
(traditionally those providing the financial resources) and
10 members from other countries. Demands for a majority
of seats for developing countries suffering from the impacts
of climate change were not successful.
However, the main dispute over the issue of loss and
damage concerned the demand of developing countries,
especially the AOSIS and the most vulnerable countries to
include it into the workplan for the Paris Agreement next
year. This turned loss and damage into a crunch issue in
the final hours and was resolved by way of a typical
compromise: the issue is not mentioned in the operative
paragraphs of the Lima call for climate action nor in the
‘elements’ paper attached to it, but instead found its way
into the preambular paragraphs of the Lima call (‘...
welcoming the progress (on the issue) made in Lima ...’).
The press release of the LDC group after COP-20 makes
clear that this reference is regarded as a ‘clear intention
that the protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed
outcome with legal force to be adopted in Paris will
properly, effectively and progressively address loss and
damage in these respective legal options’.7 Some major
struggles appear to be looming ahead before and in Paris
next year ...
4.3 Adaptation
In contrast to the negotiations on loss and damage,
adaptation efforts aim to prevent damage rather than
compensate for it. Non-Annex I countries have for many
years now made some efforts to raise the status of
adaptation in the climate regime. This was successful overall
in Lima also, although not in all cases. For example, non-
Annex I countries were not successful in their attempt to
include adaptation in the workplan of the technical expert
meetings (TEMs) under WS2 of the ADP, but successful in
opening up the possibility of including adaptation in their
INDCs under Workstream 1 (see above).
As part of the ordinary routine, the parties elected
members of the Adaptation Fund Board and the Adaptation
Committee. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)
discussed the report of the committee but did not follow
its recommendation for a closer cooperation with the
finance mechanism. As regards the national adaptation plans
(NAPs), a major point of disagreement, the SBI rejected a
request by many developing countries to revise the
guidelines for the formulation of NAPs in order to allow a
stricter formalisation and bring the NAPs closer to the
finance mechanism. The next meeting of the SBI was
requested, however, to discuss better support for the
development and implementation of NAPs by the Green
Climate Fund.8
4.4 Finance
Financing climate actions and low-carbon development is
regularly a major point of contention within the climate
negotiations. With developed countries having jointly
committed to mobilising US$100 billion per year starting
in 2020, expectations on deliverance are understandably
high in developing countries. However, a definite roadmap
for upscaling current levels of funding was hoped for in
order to strengthen trust that such levels of funding would
be reached within the required timescales.
Pledges made to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) at a
high-level conference convened by UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon had amounted to slightly below US$10
billion. The GCF had originally called for countries to
pledge up to US$15 billion as initial funding for the GCF’s
initial period (2015–2018), but had lowered its call to
US$10 billion in September. During the second week in
Lima, more countries came forward with finance pledges
to the GCF. With about US$10.2 billion pledged by 27
countries, pledges now exceed the target the GCF had
7 http://ldcclimate.wordpress.com/2014/12/14/ldc-group-
statement-at-closing-of-cop-20/.
8 Decision 3/CP20 FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.2 ‘National
adaptation plans’.
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aimed for. In an unprecedented move, seven developing
countries have also pledged funding for the GCF: Peru,
Panama, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and
Mongolia.
Another positive note was struck by Germany. Whilst
in 2013 the Adaptation Fund had struggled to collect
US$100 million to be able to continue its operations, in
Lima Germany at one stroke contributed three-quarters
of this year’s US$80 million fundraising target. However,
to think that this would be a sign of a breakdown of the
‘firewall’ between developed and developing countries in
commitments would prove very wrong. Developed
countries held their ground to keep any mention of a
roadmap for upscaling climate finance to the projected
US$100 billion out of the decision on long-term finance –
a major disappointment for developing countries hoping
for reassurance that the promised finance would actually
be forthcoming.9 Developed countries’ biennial update
reports on upscaling climate finance could be used to define
elements of a pathway, but the language is weak.10
Within the negotiations on finance elements in the Paris
Agreement, the divisions between the country groupings
remained. Negotiators speaking for the like-minded
developing countries (LMDCs), the African Group and the
G77/China strongly opposed calling for ‘all’ countries to
mobilise climate finance. Negotiators for developed
countries, including the EU and the US, stressed the need
to reflect evolving capabilities and responsibilities of all
countries. This kind of polar opposition between
standpoints will certainly be very hard to resolve in the
continuing negotiations for a Paris deal.
4.5 Monitoring, reporting and verification
Some positive developments regarding the monitoring,
reporting and verification (MRV) of the parties’ efforts can
be reported from multilateral assessments (MA) of Annex
I parties’ pre-2020 mitigation efforts as part of the
international assessment and review (IAR). With the aim
of increasing transparency as well as comparability, the
historic first session assessing developed countries’ first
Biennial Review reports took place on Saturday and
Monday, 6 and 8 December. In total, the European Union
and 16 developed countries were assessed (Austria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States).
After a brief overview of the countries’ efforts regarding
the mitigation of emissions and progress towards their
emission reduction targets, the parties had the opportunity
to pose questions to the presenting country. This
opportunity was taken up by many parties and most
questions could be answered to the satisfaction of the
questioner. At some points in the session, however, the
parties criticised a lack of detail regarding the information
provided and Brazil stressed that the use of different metrics
across countries complicated the comparison of the
countries’ efforts. Nevertheless, before and after the
session, the parties as well as observer organisations stressed
the importance of the MA in building confidence and trust
among parties for future negotiations on the 2015
agreement.
4.6 Carbon markets
The negotiations on future carbon markets came to a virtual
standstill in Lima. A group of countries led by Brazil and
China blocked any further discussions on the issues of the
‘new market mechanism’ (NMM) and the ‘framework for
various approaches’ (FVA),11 arguing that negotiating
concrete modalities and procedures for the NMM and
defining the scope and purpose of the FVA would effectively
prejudge an outcome of the ADP process on a future climate
agreement. Without a clear mandate as to what role market-
based mitigation instruments will play under the new
agreement, these countries were not prepared to continue
discussions. This position was strongly contested by others,
including the EU, the Umbrella Group (UG) and the
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG). In their views, the
discussions on NMM and FVA historically predates the
Durban process and should hence be continued
independently from it.
Whilst the position of Brazil, China and others does
have some justification, it is also likely that it is motivated
to some extent by tactical considerations. Brazil and China
may want to hold back market discussion in order to save
it as a bargaining chip for last minute deals in Paris.
Historically, the clean development mechanism (CDM) was
created in just such a last minute move in Kyoto in 1997.
The parties were also not able to build on the
advancements regarding CDM modalities and procedures
that had been achieved in the intersessional meeting of the
Subsidiary Bodies in June 2014. It was not possible to reach
consensus on how to proceed with those issues on which
9 Decision 5/CP20 FCCC/CP/2014/10/Add.2 ‘Long-term
climate finance’.
10 ibid para 10.
11 For an introduction to these items see W Sterk, C Arens, L
Hermwille, N Kreibich, F Mersmann and T Wehnert ‘Warsaw
groundhog days: old friends, positions and impasses revisited all
over again’ 2013 Warsaw Climate Conference Wuppertal
(Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 2013).
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disagreement prevails and discussions under this item ended
with the decision to continue negotiations at the next
meeting of the SBI in June 2015. The lack of progress
further aggravates the crisis of international carbon markets
in the framework of the UNFCCC.
The necessity to reform the CDM had already been
iterated by countries in their opening statements as well as
in the CMP plenary. The annual CDM guidance document
focuses mainly on streamlining standards and procedures
of the CDM project cycle. For example, revisions of
baseline and monitoring methodologies are now possible
without reference to a concrete project activity. Also,
validations of monitoring plans can now take place together
with the first verification of emissions reductions. The
deregistration of CDM project activities is now endorsed
by the CMP. This step is necessary in order to avoid the
double counting of emissions reductions for CDM projects
that intend to qualify for the Chinese Certified Emissions
Reductions Scheme (CCER).
Negotiations on options for building a net mitigation
component into the CDM could not reach an agreement
amongst the parties. This would have meant a departure
from the current ‘zero-sum game’ concept of the
mechanism, meaning that the exact amount of GHG
emissions in Annex I countries needs to be offset by GHG
reductions of the same amount in non-Annex I countries.
Options to go beyond this situation, resulting in a net GHG
mitigation effect, could extend to conservative baselines,
shortened crediting periods, discounting and voluntary
cancellation of CERs. However, although alternative text
was suggested and discussed line by line several times, the
issue could not be included in the final decision.
A further bone of contention centred on the monitoring
of sustainable development effects of CDM projects, as well
as stakeholder consultation and the establishment of a
grievance mechanism. Currently, the use of the executive
board’s sustainable development tool is voluntary. Whilst
particularly the EU and St Lucia made a strong case for the
monitoring of sustainable development effects initially, their
proposals met with strong opposition from China, Brazil
and India. In the end, most of the text proposed on these
issues was deleted as no consensus could be found. The
final decision merely requests the executive board ‘to
publish its procedure for dealing with communications from
stakeholders’.12
5 Lima, Paris and beyond
5.1 Assessing the Lima outcome
Overall, COP-20 in Lima can be viewed rather critically,
but it also marked a number of positive developments.
Whilst it was dominated by the usual struggle between
industrialised and developing countries, these are not two
monolithic blocs any more. Not only the most vulnerable
countries but also AILAC and Brazil put their mark on the
proceedings by submitting constructive proposals. The
capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund was also supported
by a number of developing countries before and during
the conference. Apart from the emerging economies of
Mexico and South Korea, these also included Indonesia,
Colombia, Mongolia, Panama and Peru.
The debut of the multilateral assessment of
industrialised countries’ 2020 pledges struck another
positive note. Parties as well as observer organisations
stressed the importance of the multilateral assessment in
building confidence and trust among parties for future
negotiations on the 2015 Agreement. The ADP WS2
negotiations on enhancing pre-2020 ambition can also be
considered successful. The stalemate of the UNFCCC is
increasingly out of sync with positive developments on the
ground such as the enormous digression of prices for
renewable energy technologies and their steep rise not only
in industrialised but increasingly in emerging economies
and developing countries. The continuation of the technical
expert meetings and an improved focus towards
implementation under WS2 are positive experiences with
climate change mitigation that could create resonance
within the UNFCCC regime and create a momentum for
more ambitious mitigation commitments.
Lima also did the main thing it was supposed to do – it
will ‘bring us to Paris’, as it was formulated afterwards by
the German Vice Minister Jochen Flasbarth. The Lima call
to climate action also stipulates that there may be no
backsliding of countries and that their contributions to the
Paris Agreement need to mark a progression beyond their
current undertakings. This is an important starting point
for the discussions of what has been called a ratcheting-up
mechanism, which would ensure that in future iterations
of the commitment cycle parties will gradually increase
the level of ambition of their mitigation commitments. Of
particular importance for such a mechanism is that parties
must not use the occasion of new commitments to back-
track from their earlier commitments. Provisions for such
a mechanism are also included in the ‘Elements for a draft
negotiation text’, which has been attached to the Lima call
for climate action.12 Decision 4/CMP20 FCCC//KP/CMP/2014/9/Add.1‘Guidance relating to the clean development mechanism’.
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In addition to enshrining forward momentum in the
regime, this provision also ensures that there will continue
to be differentiation between industrialised and developing
countries in the near future, as they are at different starting
points.13
Not much more can be said, however, of the main task
of the COP relating to the new agreement. This is rather a
meagre result, even compared with the already quite low
expectations regarding the new Paris Agreement. One
should remember that, in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol
with its internationally negotiated and legally binding
targets, the negotiations at the moment centre around
voluntary pledges of different types, time-frames and
periods, which may or may not be reviewed and, if they
are to be reviewed, who will do so is not clear either. Lima
produced neither a timetable for the submission of INDCs;
nor did it agree on a communication format. Moreover,
regarding the contents of the INDCs, the Lima decision
brought about an absolute minimum of guidance only,
which will make it extremely difficult to compare and assess
the submissions of parties.
In addition, the ex ante ‘review’ part of the ‘pledge and
review’ system was largely abandoned, which is going to
make an external assessment even more complicated. It is
now left to civil society organisations and research
institutions to fill this hole as best as they can by conducting
their own reviews of countries’ INDCs. However, such
assessments require resources, even more so given the lack
of a uniform submission format for the INDCs. It therefore
remains to be seen how far reviews by civil society and
research organisations can compensate for the lack of
ambition on the part of the COP.
Lima also did not agree on a common timeframe for
the INDCs and saw some unlikely alliances on this issue.
Whilst the USA, Brazil, the LDCs and others advocated
for a 2025 timeframe, the EU, China and others stuck to
their position that INDCs should be referenced to 2030,
despite the commonly shared expectation that most INDCs
will not be compatible with the 2°C target. The ‘elements’
text has no less than 10 different options on the timeframe
for commitments/contributions.
Compared to the pledges under the Cancún
Agreements, the Lima call to climate change action might
be considered to signify progress since the Cancún pledges
were not subject to any information requiremens
whatsoever.14 All in all, however, the promise of fresh
momentum, of changed tides after the US–China
announcement and the successful capitalisation of the Green
Climate Fund has not been borne out. This became
particularly visible in the removal of the loss and damage
provisions from the ADP decision, which many perceived
as a slap in the face for AOSIS and the LDCs. Also, whilst
developed countries paid lip service to the importance of
adaptation, the Lima call is itself highly centred on
mitigation. Not engaging with the key demands of the
poorest and most vulnerable countries is surely not a way
to revive the Durban coalition of the EU, AOSIS, the LDCs
and others, which extracted the mandate to start
negotiations on the 2015 Agreement from the reluctant
trio of the US, China and India.
In summary, the UNFCCC negotiations significantly
trail behind the pace that is needed to achieve a meaningful
agreement in Paris. Whilst everyone acknowledges that
climate policy is widely off track, three years of ADP
negotiations have so far not had the result of narrowing
down the fundamental differences between countries, as
reflected in the ‘elements’ text with its myriad of options.
However, there is still almost one year and several rounds
of negotiations left until the Paris Conference.
Nontheless, even if the parties to the Climate
Convention and Protocol turn the current snail’s pace into
a sprint, the results will in all probability not be satisfactory.
The shape that the Paris Agreement is taking was called by
some delegates a system of ‘pledge and chat’ – one might
even say ‘pledge and see what happens’. Countries will
determine nationally whatever they think they will be able
to contribute to the climate agreement, without any
international ex ante review or negotiation of their
contributions. There is not even a uniform submission
format. The only constraining element the Paris Agreement
may have is the ex post review of whether countries actually
delivered their contributions or not. But it remains to be
seen how stringent this ex post review is going to be.
Even the most die-hard supporters of this approach are
not arguing that it will close the ‘emissions gap’ – the gap
between the current pledges and the reductions required
to keep the world below 2°C warming.15 It is thus becoming
increasingly obvious that the UNFCCC regime as it is
designed now is not delivering what it is supposed to,
according to Article 2: to prevent a dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
It therefore appears reasonable and, indeed, timely to
reflect on the deficiencies of the current approach, or
rather, to envision what the UN regime could seriously be
13 Lavanya Rajamani ‘Lima call to Climate Action: progress
through Modest Victories and Tentative Agreements‘ (2015)
Economic and Political Weekly 14–17.
14 ibid.
15 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) ‘The
Emissions Gap Report 2014’  http://www.unep.org/publications/
ebooks/emissionsgapreport2014/portals/50268/pdf/
EGR2014_LOWRES.pdf.
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY – LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE PUBLISHED BY LAWTEXT PUBLISHING LIMITED
www.lawtext.com
232 [2014] 6 ENV. LIABILITY : CLIMATE POLICY: ROAD WORKS AND NEW HORIZONS – FROM LIMA TO PARIS AND BEYOND : OTT ET AL
expected to deliver and whether there are complementary
roads (or paths) that should be explored. This article will
now concentrate on these two major issues: the
improvement of the UNFCCC and the establishment of a
parallel track of negotiations in a club of pioneer countries.
5.2 Homework for the Paris Agreement
5.2.1 The Paris Agreement should go beyond emissions
accounting and include multi-dimensional commitments
After more than 20 years of failing to come to an adequate
agreement, it is worth asking whether the international
climate negotiations as they have been pursued have the
right target in their sights. The UN climate regime has so
far focused almost exlusively on GHG emissions.
Commitments in the Kyoto Protocol have been conceived
of in terms of emission targets and there is a widespread
sentiment that emission targets for developing countries
would also be the most adequate approach to address
climate change. This carbon centred ‘scientific’ approach
had been developed by the IPCC in its first drafts of a UN
convention on climate change. As climate change is caused
by the accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions in the
atmosphere, it was concluded that policy should put a cap
on emissions and ratchet that cap down over time, ideally
using this cap as a basis for an emissions trading system,
which would put a price on emissions and thus drive
investments and innovation into low-emission alternatives.
However, this approach has so far manifestly failed to
produce the desired outcome. This may partly be due to
the UNFCCC’s consensus rule, as will be discussed further
below, but the approach also has inherent limitations.
Framing commitments as ‘obligations of result’ – the
French law concept whereby there is an obligation to
achieve a certain result – is not the only approach available
to international regulation. Instead of – or in addition to –
obligations of result, commitments may also be framed as
‘obligations of conduct’,16 ie commitments may refer to
what countries are supposed to do, rather than – or in
addition to – what they are supposed to achieve. The World
Trade Organization (WTO) is one example that prescribes
desired behaviour rather than desired outcomes. The WTO
does not prescribe how much countries should trade; it
prescribes what policies and measures countries should
pursue and must not pursue in order to promote and not
impede trade.
The climate regime clearly needs a reference to
emissions as these constitute the environmental problem
that is supposed to be solved. All climate policy ultimately
needs to be measured against the yardstick of whether
aggregate global emissions are on track for the below 2°C
target. To make this judgment, accurate and verifiable
economy-wide emission accounting by at least all major
emitters is crucial.
However, arguably all political incentives point in the
direction of setting weak rather than strong emission
targets. We therefore recommend reconsidering the
political wisdom of focusing almost exclusively on
emissions quantities, as the climate regime has done so far.
Countries should adopt further commitments in addition
to emission targets to compensate for the deficits of the
emisssions-based approach, of which there are several.
There is hardly any country in the world where setting
strong emissions targets yields political rewards for
politicians. On the contrary, industrialised countries fear
that taking the lead will lead to deindustrialisation and
developing countries see being able to emit CO
2
 without
constraint as much-needed ‘development space’. Whilst
many have tried to stop talking about ‘burden sharing’ and
instead talk about ‘effort sharing’, burden sharing is what
everyone has on their minds.17 Yvo de Boer, the former
head of the UNFCCC Secretariat, reportedly identified this
lack of confidence in the viability of low-emission
development as the key factor behind the failure of
Copenhagen to deliver the hoped-for agreement.18
In addition, quantity commitments are equivalent to
giving countries money. Stiglitz opines that: ‘If emissions
were appropriately restricted, the value of emission rights
would be a couple trillion dollars a year – no wonder that
there is a squabble over who should get them’.19 The effect
is that countries have an incentive to keep their
commitments as weak as possible in order to maximise
the volume of sellable allowances.
Furthermore, it is in fact hardly possible for
governments credibly to promise achievement of specific
future emission levels since emissions are strongly
influenced by factors such as economic and population
growth, which governments can at best influence indirectly,
16 Daniel Bodansky ‘The Durban Platform: issues and options for a
2015 agreement’ Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2012) 4.
17 As evidenced for example by a list of statements by political
leaders quoted in William Moomaw, Mihaela Papa ‘Creating a
mutual gains climate regime through universal clean energy
services’ (2012) 12(4) Climate Policy 505–20 at 507.
18 ‘Doha: loss and damage in the desert’ (10 December 2012)
James’ Blog: a blog from BusinessGreen http://
www.businessgreen.com/bg/james-blog/2230841/doha-loss-and-
damage-in-the-desert.
19 Joseph Stiglitz ‘Overcoming the Copenhagen failure’ (6
January 2010) http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/
overcoming-the-copenhagen-failure; see also Joseph E Stiglitz
Making Globalization Work (W W Norton & Co New York/London
2006).
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if at all. Technology choices are in many cases also not under
the control of national policy as most countries are
technology takers. These risks are especially pertinent for
rapidly industrialising countries. Rapid industrialisation and
urbanisation is in itself a challenge for reducing emissions.
In addition, future emission levels are much more difficult
to forecast in rapidly growing economies than in less rapidly
growing ones. The prevalence of fears that quantity
commitments may become a ‘cap on development’ is hence
not surprising.20
Finally, if tradable as in the Kyoto Protocol, quantity
commitments constitute not only a minimum but also the
maximum emissions reduction and adjusting commitments
once they have been set has proven to be nearly impossible.
The Kyoto approach thus effectively caps ambition.
It may also be sub-complex to see climate change solely
through the lens of emissions because it frames climate
change as an environmental problem only. But arguably
climate change is fundamentally an economic and
development problem, not a traditional environmental
problem, so the traditional end-of-pipe approach to
environmental regulation will arguably not do if pursued
in isolation. Unfortunately, in the UNFCCC the issue of
sustainable development has been relegated to the status
of a ‘co-benefit’ that is seen as nice to have but not strictly
necessary, which is fundamentally at odds with the priorities
of developing countries, who clearly see development as
their first priority and emission reductions as a co-benefit.
Whilst they are not as explicit about it, the same also applies
to the traditional industrialised countries. When looking
for example at the German Renewable Energy Act, it lists
four objectives that are to be achieved. However, only one
of these relates to climate and the environment and the
other three are immediate benefits the German legislator
hopes to achieve: reducing the long-term macro-economic
cost of energy supply, preserving fossil energy resources
and promoting technology development.21
The UN climate regime may therefore benefit from
turning the priorities around and framing commitments
in a way that puts sustainable development benefits front
and centre. Emission targets should therefore be
complemented by other types of commitments that do not
trigger fears of imposing a ‘cap on development’ and that
are more in line with what governments can actually deliver,
namely implementing policies.
5.2.2 Possible types of multi-dimensional commitments
As a result of these considerations it is suggested that
commitments related to economic inputs such as energy
sources and policies should be adopted. Addressing
economic and policy inputs will allow development
approaches that reduce emissions, whilst at the same time
promoting sustainable development more generally. In
addition, this approach would allow international
commitents to be anchored directly within the broader
context of national development, energy and environment
planning. This would help ensure that development
objectives are not jeopardised and at the same time facilitate
the mainstreaming of climate objectives, increasing the
chances of actual implementation.22
With regard to economic inputs a suggested example
is energy-related CO
2
 emissions, which account for about
60 per cent of global emissions and which are determined
by: the size of the population, the size of the economy, the
energy intensity of the economy and the CO
2
 intensity of
energy supply. Economic and population trends are largely
beyond the influence of governments and will rarely be
made the subject of international agreements. Countries
should therefore commit to improving the energy




Improving energy productivity and scaling up clean
energy may dovetail more directly than emission targets
with what is seen as being in the national interest.
Experience seems to indicate that over-achieving clean
energy targets is often seen as a prompt for doing more,
while over-achieving emission targets is seen as an invitation
to rest on one’s laurels. The EU has achieved its Kyoto target
for 2020 seven years ahead of schedule but is nonetheless
unable to strengthen it. By contrast, the Chinese solar PV
target for 2015 was initially set at 5 GW and then repeatedly
raised to 10 GW, 15 GW, 21 GW and, finally, to 35 GW.24
Another example is India, which recently quintupled its
solar energy target for 2022 from 20 GW to 100 GW.25
20 W Sterk, C Beuermann, C Dienst, K Hillebrandt and others
‘Submission to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action, Workstream 1 “The 2015 Agreement”’
(Wuppertal 2013) http://wupperinst.org/uploads/
tx_wupperinst/ADPWS1SubmissionWuppertalInstitute.pdf.
21 Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (25 October 2008) BGBl. I S
2074 http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/eeg_2014/.
22 Sterk and others (n 20); Navroz K Dubash, Radhika Khosla ‘The
road from Lima’ (12 December 2014) http://indianexpress.com/
article/opinion/columns/the-road-from-lima/; Niklas Höhne, Lina Li
and Julia Larkin ‘Characteristics of mitigation commitments’ (Ecofys
2014) http://www.ecofys.com/en/publication/characteristics-of-
mitigation-commitments/.
23 Aviel Verbruggen ‘A turbo drive for the global reduction of
energy-related CO2 emissions’ (2011) 3(4) Sustainability 532–48.
24 Giles Parkinson ‘Solar insights: China lifts PV target to 35
GW’ (2013) http://reneweconomy.com.au/2013/solar-insights-
china-lifts-pv-target-to-35gw-10104.
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Some analysts argue that the climate regime should shift
fully to a policy-based approach, taking as their model the
WTO with its high level of detailed policy coordination.26
However, while such an approach may have much to
recommend it, it is worth noting that the WTO also started
out small, focusing mostly on tariffs, and took half a century
to develop to its current status. It is also necessary to take
into account the experience of trying to negotiate
coordination of policies and measures in the original Kyoto
Protocol negotiations, which ultimately failed.27
Nonetheless, there are key policy levers that
recommend themselves for special attention and are already
the subject of international discussions. One is fossil fuel
subsidies, which should be phased out by all countries as
soon as possible. According to the IMF, simply removing
these subsidies globally could reduce global CO
2
 emissions
by 13 per cent. Whilst the purported objective of these
subsidies often is to help with energy access of the poor,
most of the benefits are actually captured by higher-income
households.28 The social impacts of removing fossil fuel
subsidies should therefore be manageable, but will
nevertheless require attention. A win-win approach would
be to redirect those resources into supporting low-income
households in upgrading the energy efficiency of their
buildings, appliances and transport options. There is already
a G20 agreement to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, which
could be built on and strengthened.
In addition, governments should incorporate the costs
of climate change into all government procurement
decisions, in particular investment decisions on long-lived
infrastructure. Thus, instead of market prices, investment
decisions should be based on a shadow price that includes
all territorial and extraterritorial externalities that will be
caused by the investment.29 To further facilitate the
anchoring of climate protection in all government
decisions, it would be helpful if all countries committed to
adopting comprehensive zero-emission development
strategies covering all sectors.
Evaluation of the experience from implementing
concrete actions based on systematic monitoring should
contribute to shifting opinions about the feasibility of
climate protection and thus allow knowledge-based
adoption of ever more ambitious commitments step by step.
5.2.3 Use of emission targets needs to be improved
In addition to adopting multi-dimensional commitments
in addition to emission targets, the use of emission targets
themselves should also be improved. Positive dynamics on
the ground will only have a positive climate impact if
emission targets do not effectively cap ambition, as is the
case in the Kyoto Protocol. The 2015 Agreement needs to
be organised to allow a race to the top, rather than a race
to the lowest common denominator. Emission targets
should therefore not be tradable and bankable by
governments to reduce the incentives to adopt weak
commitments and to prevent targets from becoming a cap
on ambition. Emission trading should arguably only be
pursued at the level of companies, for example in domestic
emission trading systems, as companies actually make their
trading and investment decisions on the basis of economic
rather than political considerations.
Furthermore, the Kyoto basket approach should be
abandoned; each GHG should be regulated separately. The
basket approach suggests an equivalence of greenhouse
gases where in fact none exists, allowing relatively easy
reductions of short-lived gases to substitute for more
difficult reductions of long-lived CO
2
. However, it is
cumulative carbon that is the key determinant of future
warming. Most CO
2
 emissions are caused by long-lived
infrastructure such as power plants, buildings and transport
infrastructure, which once in place, cause emissions for
decades. Offsetting reductions of CO
2
 with other
reductions therefore means losing time, not buying time.30
5.2.4 Contributions need to be assessed internationally
Whilst the Lima Conference failed to agree on assessing
countries’ contributions individually, this deficit may still be
rectified in the coming rounds of negotiations. The Lima call
to climate change action specifically stipulates that ‘the
arrangements specified in this decision in relation to intended
nationally determined contributions are without prejudice to
the legal nature and content of the intended nationally
determined contributions of Parties or to the content of the
protocol, another legal instrument or agreed outcome with
legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties’.31
25 ‘India‘s Modi raises solar investment target to $100 bln by
2022’ (2 January 2015) Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/01/02/india-solar-idUSL3N0UG13H20150102.
26 See eg David Victor Global Warming Gridlock. Creating More
Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet (Cambridge University
Press Cambridge 2011).
27 Sebastian Oberthür, Hermann E Ott The Kyoto Protocol:
International Climate Policy for the 21st Century (Springer Berlin 1999).
28 International Monetary Fund ‘Energy subsidy reform: lessons
and implications’ (28 January 2013) http://www.imf.org/
external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf.
29 Sterk and others (n 20).
30 Raymond Pierrehumbert ‘Losing time, not buying time’
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/12/
losing-time-not-buying-time/.
31 ‘Lima call for climate action’ (n 1) para 8.
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The Paris Agreement should spell out the procedures
for reviewing and strengthening the INDCs submitted over
the course of 2015, as well as procedures for agreeing on
future commitment periods under the new agreement. The
post-Paris review and future negotiations should be based
on an overall review of adequacy, as is foreseen to be
produced by the Secretariat in 2015 and, on the most recent
information on the implementation of the respective
current commitments, projections for achieving the
commitments and assessments of the potential for
increasing ambition. The necessary information should be
submitted as part of the parties’ national communication
and biennial (update) reports. Parties should also develop
criteria and procedures to compare commitments in terms
of equity. Proposed commitments should be assessed by
an independent technical panel and other parties.
5.2.5 Commitments should give clear short-term and
long-term directions
Regarding the time horizon of commitments, longer time
horizons facilitate private sector planning and investment
decisions because they provide more long-term investment
certainty. However, ambitious long-term targets usually
require immediate short-term actions. With a long-term
horizon for commitments, concrete measures may be
postponed and achievements hard to measure. In addition,
unexpected events (such as economic turbulence or
breakthroughs in science or technology) could render
targets with a long-term horizon outdated long before the
target year.32
It is furthermore worth considering that studies of the
emission pathways consistent with limiting warming to 2°C
or even 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, taking into
account the technical and economic feasibility, show clear
constraints on emission pathways. The level of ambition
needed for the 2030s is directly related to the national and
international action that is undertaken in the 2020s. If the
ADP Agreement in 2015 were to lock in insufficient
emission commitments until 2030, there is a considerable
risk that it could be politically impossible, or at least
extremely difficult, to change this outcome, as exemplified
by the EU’s inability to strengthen its 2020 target.
Another aspect is that one key function of the UNFCCC
is to create moments of concentrated public attention and
political pressure. It is doubtful whether events such as the
joint Sino–US announcement would be occurring if there
was not a new agreement to negotiate. In addition, one
may hope that the globally increasing uptake of renewables
and other climate friendly solutions will create new
momentum on the ground. These dynamics should then
be brought back into the UNFCCC, but this would require
having a political entry point, preferably a new round of
negotiating contributions. If a climate club of forerunners
(see below) was created, it would also require such an entry
point to stimulate the UNFCCC regime. The climate would
certainly be much better served by having 5-year instead
of 10-year intervals between such entry points.
Short periods, such as five years, would allow
subsequent political leaders to increase political ambition
and open up the opportunity to modify inadequate
agreements adopted in 2015. They would also offer the
ability to respond quickly to new scientific and
technological developments. The EU and others suggest
that these functions could be fulfilled by complementing
the 2030 timeframe with interim reviews in order to
strengthen the level of ambition along the way, and the
‘elements text’ does contain options for such a review and
enhancement mechanism. However, experience to date has
been that targets are unmovable once they have been set
internationally, the EU itself being the prime example.
In addition to clear directions for the short term the
climate regime should also provide long-term certainty for
investments. A substantial part of emissions stems from
long-lived infrastructure, such as power plants, buildings
and transport infrastructure. Once built, this infrastructure
will stay in place for decades. To give proper direction to
these investments, the parties should complement short-
term commitment periods with a meaningful long-term
goal or goals. For example, the German Advisory Council
on Global Change has suggested that the UNFCCC should
establish a goal to reduce CO
2
 emissions from fossil fuels
to zero worldwide by 2070 at the latest.33
6 A fresh start: moving faster in a club
Apart from reflections on the improvement of the
UNFCCC climate regime, the situation also invites a more
fundamental analysis. This is because the current regime
has been operating for more than 20 years now – and still
has failed to produce a treaty that is adequate for the task:
providing a framework that unites, elicits and supports the
world’s endeavours to avert a ‘dangerous interference with
the climate system’, as Article 2 of the Convention
stipulates. After 20 years the prime question is not only
how to improve the current climate regime, but also
whether the UNFCCC should serve as the only basis for
the world’s endeavour. In other words, should the UN
32 See Höhne, Li and Larkin (n 22).
33 German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) Climate
Protection as a World Citizen Movement (Special Report Berlin 2014).
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regime be supplemented by a second track for first movers
or pioneers.34
It is probably wrong to put the Convention at the centre
of investigation, because the UNFCCC is, above all, merely
an instrument to organise the general technical, scientific
and political co-operation of the parties without prescribing
specific obligations. This approach was the wisdom of
several decades of environmental law-making in the 1990s:
international cooperation and ‘regime building’ was
orchestrated in a step-by-step approach, involving
conferences and soft-law declarations as a first step, the
conclusion of a ‘framework convention’ as a second and
the adoption of a ‘protocol’ as an offspring of the
Convention as the third and final step. Corresponding to
this was a gradually higher degree of commitments:
Whereas the soft law instrument usually did not have a
legally binding effect, the Convention would define a legal
objective and stipulate technical and political cooperation
and the protocol would finally lay down specific legally
binding obligations.35
The investigation on the flaws of the current regime
must therefore concentrate on the Kyoto Protocol and its
approach, since this was meant to produce the specific rules
to put the world on a sustainable pathway. In one important
aspect the Kyoto Protocol is significantly different from all
other environmental protocols: whereas the Montreal
Protocol, the protocols to the Biodiversity Convention or
to the Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary
Air Pollution, the protocols to the Basel Convention on
hazardous wastes or to the Barcelona Convention for the
protection of the Mediterranean Sea all require the taking-
on of specific obligations by all parties upon ratification,36
the Kyoto Protocol does not. On the contrary, according
to its Article 24 the Protocol is open for ratification by all
Parties to the Convention – but the obligations contained
in Articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol are directed at ‘Annex I
Parties’37 only, referring to the list of industrialised
countries contained in an annex to the treaty. Non-Annex
I Parties therefore, namely non-industrialised countries at
the time of the adoption of the Protocol that are not
included in the Annex, have no specific obligations under
the Protocol.
The intention was to involve all countries in the further
evolution of the regime. On the one hand, it was thought
that vulnerable countries most affected by climate change
should be part of any agreement –AOSIS especially strongly
demanded that its member countries should be allowed to
ratify. On the other hand, the impacts of measures for the
protection of the climate would be felt by all countries
around the globe and there was a view that all countries
should accordingly have a say in the formulation of these
measures. Despite these good intentions, the consequences
were somewhat detrimental, because this allowed countries
to join the Protocol that never had any intention to engage
in serious climate protection – and consequently used every
possibility at hand to prevent progress. Most destructively,
however, it incorporated the deep schism of the Convention
between ‘Annex I’ and ‘non-Annex I’ countries into the
Kyoto Protocol and this has plagued its deliberations ever
since (see above).
This difference from the practice in other regimes was
not merely a tiny detail; it fundamentally changed the
dynamics of the subsequent evolution. In effect, the parties
in Kyoto missed the chance to create a ‘club’ but relegated
the Protocol to the same status as its mother treaty, the
UNFCCC. Since the countries did not have to pay an
‘entrance fee’ upon ratification of the Protocol, it also failed
to create an exclusive ‘club good’ but created benefits (such
as the CDM) without demanding an entrance fee.
In the Montreal Protocol, for example, each country
that ratifíed had to accept the (differentiated) phase-out
schedule for CFCs or halons prescribed in the treaty, with
developing countries being allowed a delay of 10 years for
the fulfilment of those targets. In return, the parties to the
Protocol were able to trade in regulated substances (ie they
became part of the CFC cartel) and each ratifying
developing country was eligible for financial and technical
support. In a nutshell the Montreal Protocol, and this is
also true for the protocols in other regimes, is characterised
by a careful balance between rights (trade, support) and
duties (phase-out), whereas the Kyoto Protocol is not. This
imbalance has made a progressive evolution of the regime
extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Adding to these structural difficulties, the UNFCCC is
governed by a strong consensual approach.38  There are
34 See Hermann E Ott ‘Why we need climate clubs: a second
track climate strategy’ http://climate-l.iisd.org/guest-articles/
why-we-need-climate-clubs-a-second-track-climate-strategy/.
35 Hermann E Ott ‚Umweltregime im Völkerrecht‘ (Nomos
Verlag 1998); see also Thomas Gehring ‘Dynamic international
regimes: institutions for international environmental governance’
(Frankfurt am Main 1994).
36 ibid.
37 Strictly speaking the articles refer to Annex B of the Kyoto
Protocol; however, in general parlance, industrialised countries are
referred to as ‘Annex I Parties’.
38 This may have happened partly because the UNFCCC was
negotiatied under the auspices of the UN General Assembly and not
under the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) like
many other environmental treaties. The most advanced model is the
Montreal Protocol, where desisions by majority on already
regulated substances take effect even for those parties that have
voted against, without any need for subsequent ratification; see eg
Ott (n 35) 155 ff.
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some provisions in the treaty on majority voting – for the
adoption of amendments, annexes or protocols – but these
decisions only take effect for those parties that subsequently
ratify.39
Furthermore, the practice of decision-making is
governed by the Rules of Procedure (RoP).40 Rule 42
stipulates that majority voting can take place if all other
efforts to arrive at a consensus have been exhausted.
However, since the first Conference of the Parties, Rule
42 is barred from being applied because of the opposition
of Saudi Arabia and other OPEC countries before COP-
1.41 Each COP (and CMP) thus adopts the Rules of
Procedure for each new session – with the exception of
Rule 42. As a result, by default each and every decision in
the work of all bodies of the regime must be taken by
consensus. This provides ample opportunity for countries
that oppose meaningful action on climate change to pursue
their own interests and/or to make progress very difficult.42
This does not mean, of course, that the COPs and all
other bodies cannot work properly on a day-to-day basis.
There is an immense array of activities in the dozen or
more convention and protocol bodies which prove that
countries do cooperate in the regime.43 Unfortunately,
however, this does not lead to a stronger regime. Not only
has strengthening proven to be impossible; so too has
applying those rules to more countries (ie some of the
former developing countries). The breakdown of the
negotiations in Copenhagen 2009 has finally exposed the
basic flaw of a consensus-based regime. Since then,
negotiations on a global agreement have resumed but on a
fundamentally lower level of ambition that is insufficient
to close the emissions gap (see above).
Although some actors have certainly been more active
than others in preventing a progressive evolution of the
regime, this inability to come up with an adequate response
to climate change cannot be blamed on specific countries
but must be attributed to the approach as such. It may well
be that consensus is not possible in an area as contested as
climate change, an issue as relevant for the economic
wellbeing of nations and people – and as relevant for
political careers. It may be impossible to arrive at a
consensus for regulations that devalue large fortunes
because fossil reserves must stay in the ground. In the
absence of compensation, not using one-third of the global
oil reserves, half of the gas reserves and 80 per cent of coal
reserves44 amounts to a massive reallocation of wealth and
leads to tectonic changes in the geopolitical arena.
Transformations on such a scale are very probably not the
result of cooperative activities on a global scale, but require
pioneers to develop the technical and social innovations,
which then disperse and become the global mainstream.
For these reasons, a fresh start is suggested here, to
complement the current process of the climate regime with
a second track. This would establish a climate club where
pioneer countries can join forces and harvest the benefits
of mutual assistance and cooperation in the climate-friendly
transformation of their economies and societies.
There has been some discussion of the pros and cons of
an international ‘club approach’ in recent years and its
difference from global or universalist approaches has been
assessed in terms of speed, ambition, participation and
equity.45 Most of the clubs that have emerged in the climate
arena have, however, not exhibited significant progress
beyond the slow pace of the UNFCCC regime. One
possible explanation is the fact that they have concentrated
on narrower issues (such as specific gases) and none of them
was set up to provide a stronger framework than the global
effort.46 Some of these clubs were actually set up with the
aim of diverting attention away from the UNFCCC regime
and to provide an attractive – and weaker – alternative.47
The pioneer climate club envisaged here would, on the
contrary, be set up with the explicit objective of achieving
faster and more effective progress in the regulation and
implementation of international climate policy. A fresh start
would above all provide the opportunity to get the rules
and institutions right. Most important, a group of
39 See Oberthür and Ott (n 27) 253 ff, also in German (Opladen
2000) 321 ff.
40 For an overview see Farhana Yamin, Joanna Depledge The
International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and
Procedures (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2004).
41 See Oberthür and Ott (n 27) 45 ff.
42 See Luke Kemp Framework for the Future: The Possibility of
Majority Voting Within the United Nations Framework Convention on




43 For an overview of the multitude of bodies see http://
unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php.
44 Christophe McGlade, Paul Ekins ‘The geographical
distribution of fossul fuel reserves unused when limiting global
warming to 2°C’ (2015) 517 Nature 187 http://www.nature.com/
nature/journal/v517/n7533/full/nature14016.html.
45 For an analysis see F Biermann, P Pattberg, H van Asselt and F
Zelli ‘The fragmentation of global governance architectures: a
framework for analysis’ (2009) 9(1) Global Environmental Politics 14.
See also R O Keohane, D G Victor ‘The regime complex for climate
change’ (2011) 9(1) Perspectives on Politics 7.
46 See L Weischer, J Morgan and M Patel ‘Climate clubs: can
small groups of countries make a big difference in addressing
climate change?’ (2012) 21(3) Review of European Community and
International Environmental Law 177;
47 For example the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean
Development and Climate initiatied in 2005 by the Bush
administration http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asia-
Pacific_Partnership_on_Clean_Development_and_Climate.
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leadership countries could close the yawning gap between
the necessities of quick reactions in the face of ever-faster
change by, for example, adopting rules of procedure that
allow for majority voting and fast-track decision-making.
The most obvious option for setting up such a club
would be the adoption of another protocol in the
framework of the UNFCCC. This protocol could contain
specific (and differentiated) obligations and be open for all
parties to the Convention willing to take on those
commitments. In addition to the adoption of a second
protocol, a new annex or another amendment would also
serve the aim of creating a smaller club inside the existing
regime.48 However, although the theoretical possibility for
such a strategy exists, the practical chance for its realisation
is almost zero because the adoption of any amendment or
protocol would require the consensus of all other parties.
Thus, it is not possible to form a ‘break-out group’ within
the framework of the UNFCCC against the opposition of
other countries.
A more realistic approach is therefore suggested, namely
to complement the global negotiations in the framework
of the United Nations with a smaller, more flexible
approach under a strategy of different speeds. If the best
solution, namely a global treaty with legally binding
commitments from all major emitters, is barred – at least
for the foreseeable future – it makes sense to go for a
‘second best’ solution.49 Negotiations on such a new climate
treaty should be initiated shortly after the conclusion of
COP-21 in Paris.50
This ‘Alliance of the ambitious’ or ‘First movers club’
would be open to unite ambitious countries from Europe,
Asia, Latin America and Africa to combat climate change
effectively. There are a number of countries on all
Continents that it is suggested would be open to such an
initiative because they view climate policy not as a burden
and a hardship but as an opportunity for global prosperity
that preserves our very basis of life.51 In addition to the
nation states, the agreement could be open to regional
entities such as the federal states in the US or the Länder
in Germany.
Apart from the question of membership, there are a
number of other issues that would have to be addressed
when establishing such a treaty.52 It would need to be
decided, for example, whether a quantitative target
approach is chosen and, if so, whether these targets are
aiming at emissions as in the present regime or at the energy
input. Other questions include the benefits associated with
becoming a member beyond the exchange of information
or financial support. Should such a club, for example,
establish special conditions for trade in certain climate
relevant goods for its members, a strategy that was
successfully employed by the Montreal Protocol? For the
UNFCCC, some have proposed that only countries with
absolute caps on economy-wide, sectoral or jurisdictional
emissions should be allowed to participate in international
emissions trading mechanisms.53 A variant for a club outside
the UNFCCC could be an agreement among its members
not to trade emission units with non-members. The larger
the club, the more this would constitute an incentive for
non-members to join. Finally, the need for measures to
safeguard the competitiveness of the industrial sector would
need to be explored, and whether for example a carbon
border adjustment would be required.
Such a club of forerunners could help to inject some of
the much-needed dynamic that is required to put the world
on a path compatible with its ecological limits. It could
also be the place where forerunners could develop and
gather practical experience with multi-dimensional
commitments that go beyond the narrow focus on GHG
emissions only, as discussed above. As a side effect, the
formation of a climate club could restore hope all over our
planet that our societies will finally begin to deal effectively
with the biggest threat to our civilisation.
48 See eg Foundation for International Law and Development
(FIELD) ‘The 2015 climate agreement: should countries qualify
first to join the best part?’ http://www.field.org.uk/blog/2014/
08/18/the-2015-climate-agreement-should-countriesqualify-first-
to-join-the-best-part.
49 See Hermann E Ott ‘Changing course in international climate
policy: reaching a global agreement with different speeds’ (2011)
27 FACET Commentary http://www.facet-online.org/facet/wp-
content/uploads/FACET_27_Ott.pdf.
50 The conclusion of another treaty on climate protection is not
prohibited by the existence of the UNFCCC as long as it does not
contradict the objectives of that treaty.
51 Examples are, in Asia: the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,
Bangladesh and maybe the People’s Republic of China; in Africa:
South Africa, Morocco; in Latin America: the members of the
AILAC group, Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, the AOSIS
countries; in Europe: Germany, Denmark, France, and maybe
Romania.
52 Lutz Weischer, Jennifer Morgan ‘The solar economy club:
implementing a leadership club approach to international climate
policy’, a short study commissioned by the Green Party
Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag http://
tinyurl.com/l6fwxko.
53 See eg Environmental Defense Fund ‘A home for all:
architecture of a future global framework for mitigation action
under the “Framework for Various Approaches”’ (September 2014)
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/smsn/ngo/473.pdf.
